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REsTITUTION-ELECTION OF REMEDms-ACTioN IN QuAs1-CoNTRACT 
AGAINST JoINT ToRTFEASOR As BARRING FRAun ACTION AGAINST OTHER JoINT 
ToRTFEASORs-Plaintiff sued for fraud, alleging that defendant engraving com-
panies secretly agreed with an agent of the plaintiff to give the agent a com-
mission in return for which the agent was to contract for engraving work to 
be done by the defendants for plaintiff at a rate in excess of the fair market 
price for such work. Upon discovery of the fraud and prior to the commence-
ment of this action, plaintiff had instituted an action in a state court against 
its agent for money had and received, and had obtained an attachment. Upon 
defendants' motion to dismiss the fraud action, held, motion granted. The 
prior election of the plaintiff to sue its agent in the state court ex contractu 
and the securing of an attachment against him affirmed the acts of that agent 
in dealing with the defendants, and plaintiff is now estopped to bring this 
suit against them. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, (D. C. Calif. 1954) 123 F. 
Supp. 131. 
The principal case indicates that the doctrine of election of remedies, 1 
despite constant criticism,2 still presents a major hazard to plaintiffs. Many 
of the cases purporting to bar a plaintiff from relief because he has made an 
election of remedies could be better explained in other terms, such as estoppel 
or election of substantive rights (afflrmance or disaffirmance) in a voidable 
transaction.3 There remains a group of cases, however, in which such distinct 
1 For a concise statement of the doctrine, see Hine, "Election of Remedies, A Criti-
cism," 26 HARV. L. REv. 707 at 707 (1913). 
2 Ibid.; Deinard and Deinard, "Election of Remedies," 6 MINN. L. REv. 341 (1922); 
Rothschild, "A Remedy for Election of Remedies: A Proposed Act to Abolish Election of 
Remedies," 14 CoRN. L.Q. 141 (1929). 
3 See, e.g., Gloeser v. Moore, 284 Mich. 106, 278 N.W. 781 (1938), where plaintiff 
was denied rescission because of previous acts constituting an election to affirm the trans-
action. This does not depend on any election of remedies as such, although the headnote 
describes it as such a case. See also 38 CoL. L. REv. 292 (1938). 
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elements are not present. The problem is then to determine whether the liti-
gant's causes of action include an element of inconsistency, since it is on in-
consistency that the doctrine of election depends.4 The court in the principal 
case finds this inconsistency in the fact that the action brought in the state court 
was ex contractu while the action in the principal case is ex delicto.5 But 
this fails to give recognition to the real nature of the prior assumpsit action. 
Such an action is inconsistent with the subsequent deceit action only if one 
takes seriously the fiction of an implied contract, 6 since both actions are in 
truth based on the fraud of the plaintiff's agent and of the defendants. Nor 
does the doctrine serve any useful purpose in cases like the principal case. Al-
though the prevailing view appears to be that the fact that the second action 
is against a person not a party to the first suit will not, in itself, prevent applica-
tion of the doctrine,7 this is difficult to justify. It does not appear that the 
defendants were in any way prejiidiced by commencement of the previous 
action in the state court, since they were not parties to that suit.8 Nor does 
the public interest in the prompt dispatch of litigation justify the doctrine. 
The courts universally allow separate actions against joint tortfeasors9 and the 
fact that those actions may be inconsistent does not add in the least to the time 
consumed by them. The result reached, then, must be justified bY. the in-
consistency and not the multiplicity of the actions. But where that incon-
sistency results merely from a fiction used only for pleading purposes and does 
not represent an actual ratification of the agent's actions,10 the better rule, 
absent prejudice to the defendant or to the public interest, would be to allow 
the plaintiff all appropriate remedies, without imposing upon him the necessity 
of choosing one particular theory upon which he will seek recovery.11 
Douglas Pech, S.Ed. 
4 Principal case at 135; CLARK, CoJ,>E PLEADING 493 (1947). 
5 Principal case at 136. 
6 KEENER, QuASx-CoNTRACTS 211 (1893). For cases holding action of assump;it 
consistent with deceit action, see Mintz v. Jacob, 163 Mich. 280, 128 N.W. 211 (1910); 
Bolinger v. Giles, 125 Kan. 53, 262 P. 1022 (1928). 
7 Lindburg v. Engster, 220 Iowa 1073, 264 N.W. 31 (1935); Weaver v. Detroit Bank, 
330 Mich. 366, 47 N.W. (2d) 650 (1951). Contra: Huffman v. Hughlett & Pyatt, 11 
Lea (79 Tenn.) 549 (1883); Kuechle v. Springer, 145 ill. App. 127 (1908). See 116 
A.L.R. 601 (1938). 
s It has been said that the doctrine of election of remedies, like res judicata, is based 
on "the maxim which forbids that one shall be twice.vexed for • . • the same cause." 
United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 at 301, 43 S.Ct. 100 (1922). If this 
is true the doctrine should not apply in any case where the defendant was not a party to 
the prior suit. 
9 116 A.L.R. 601 at 609 (1938), citing cases. 
10 In Schenck v. State Line Telegraph Co., 238 N.Y. 308 at 312, 144 N.E. 592 
(1924), Cardozo, J., pointed out that, "The distinction [between election of remedies and 
election of substantive rights] is one not infrequently obscured, and yet important to be 
heeded. Often what is spoken of in opinions as a choice beti.veen remedies is in reality 
a choice of 'an alternative substantive right' •••. Ratification, however, is not in itself the 
choice of a remedy, though the choice of a remedy may be evidence of ratification." 
11 See Rothschild, "A Remedy for Election of Remedies: A Proposed Act to Abolish 
Election of Remedies," 14 CoRN. L.Q. 141 (1929). 
